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By Patrick Lefler
This past April, the findings from two separate accidents from very high-profile organizations were released within days of each other. Both accidents were similar in that each occurred in what could be described as a regular training session that resulted in the death of a single individual. While the investigation results were also similar in the sense that they both cited “lack of oversight and procedures” as the primary cause, the resulting accountability of those determined to be responsible could not have been more different.
First, the University of Notre Dame released findings of their investigation of an accident where a student member of the football team’s video department was killed last fall. He was filming a Notre Dame football practice when the 40-foot lift he was using fell over in 50 mph winds. The incident received widespread publicity in the days following the accident with questions raised as to why the student was allowed on the platform under the windy conditions, especially since just a day earlier, similar gusty conditions had forced the football team to practice indoors.
According to the Notre Dame report:
Notre Dame said that football staff responsible for advising whether it was safe to practice outside used out-of-date weather information the day a student videographer fell to his death when the hydraulic lift he was on toppled over in high winds. The university said its investigation found “the accident was caused by a confluence of unrelated events and issues”—among them a failure to provide football staff a way of monitoring wind speed during practices.
University officials acknowledged that their procedures and safeguards weren’t adequate but said they couldn’t find anyone to blame for 20-year-old Declan Sullivan’s death. “No one was monitoring wind speeds when the lift blew over, but it wasn’t anyone’s job to do that,” executive vice president John Affleck-Graves said.
The Rev. John Jenkins, the university president, said, “We did not find any individual who disregarded safety or was indifferent to safety. Consequently, there was not any individual discipline.” Jenkins also indicated that he ultimately was responsible, but he doesn’t expect any action to be taken against him.
The second finding was the Marine Corps report of the January 2011 accident where an amphibious assault vehicle sank in a Southern California harbor during a routine training exercise. Three instructors and three students were conducting driver training when the vehicle sank. Five Marines were able to exit the vehicle. The sixth Marine was trapped and killed. At the time of the accident, weather and water conditions were normal and the Marines were following standard training procedure of having two vehicles in the water so that if something did occur, another vehicle could quickly respond.
After an extensive investigation, the Marine Corps concluded that:
Lack of oversight contributed to the sinking of an amphibious vehicle during a training exercise in a Southern California harbor that killed a sergeant.
Mechanical failure and non-standard training and operating procedures were also to blame but “ultimately a lack of sufficient oversight” caused the Jan. 14, 2011 mishap.
The commander of the Assault Amphibian School Battalion was relieved of his duties along with seven other members of his staff.
The difference in how each organization treated accountability is striking. In the case of Notre Dame, not one member of the administration or coaching staff was held accountable for the death of the 20-year-old student videographer. Responsibility was parsed in such a way that no one was disciplined. From the University President Rev. John Jenkins to Head Coach Brian Kelly and on down to his entire football staff, everyone walked away relatively clean--their careers generally unaffected despite the fact that the investigation report cited a number of them as bearing some responsibility for the accident. It was a poor example of leadership from this great university.
In the case of the Marine Corps, responsibility was broadly assigned throughout and discipline was swift and harsh--eight members of the battalion staff responsible for training were held accountable for the single death. All eight were fired almost immediately after the investigation concluded; their Marine Corps careers were effectively ended. Despite the severe consequences, it was the proper action.
No matter what the organization, leadership and accountability need to go hand-in-hand. You can’t have one without the other. We should all take these situations to heart and consider how we hold ourselves accountable for our actions.
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Patrick Lefler is the founder of The Spruance Group; a management consulting firm that helps growing companies grow dramatically faster. He is a former Marine Corps officer and a graduate of both Annapolis and The Wharton School. The Spruance Group acts as a trusted partner by offering unbiased advice and providing unique solutions to help clients solve their most pressing strategy needs. For more information, visit www.spruancegroup.com or contact Patrick at: plefler@spruancegroup.com |